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ABSTRACT 
 
This Note argues that the United States should adopt a territorial tax system.  Currently, the 
United States is one of a small group of nations that employs a worldwide system of taxation.  
Under a worldwide system, income is taxed both in the country where it is earned and in the 
country where the taxpayer resides.  Alternatively, under a territorial system, income is taxed 
only in the country where it is earned.  By adopting a territorial system, the United States would 
jettison the duplicative taxation inherent in the worldwide system.  Additionally, the presence of 
anti-inversion rules, controlled foreign corporation rules, and the rise of service-based economies 
will enable the United States to adopt a territorial system without fear of large scale capital 
flight. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Johnny Depp has had a long and successful film career.  A versatile actor, Depp has lent 
his talents to a variety of roles in dozens of films spanning a multitude of genres.1  It was Depp’s 
turn as a swashbuckling bandit for the Walt Disney Corporation, though, that paved the way for 
him to spend time atop the list of Hollywood’s highest-paid actors.2  Disney’s The Pirates of the 
Caribbean franchise has grossed more than $3.7 billion over the last decade with domestic 
audiences contributing one-third of the total.3 
 Johnny Depp owes a lot to American consumers, but that has not stopped Depp, an 
American, from acquiring a reputation as a Europhile and even going so far as to describe his 
native land as “a dumb puppy.”4  So fans and non-fans alike were surprised when Depp revealed 
in an interview two years ago that he had given up his expatriate existence in France and 
returned to the incompetent canine.5  The reason for Depp’s departure was less shocking.  Like 
the fictional Jack Sparrow, Depp balked when it came to parting with his treasure.6 
 The French government wanted to classify Depp as a permanent resident, which would 
have subjected him to France’s high marginal income tax rates.7  Additionally, Depp would have 
been subject to the United States’ income tax rates regardless of where he earned his income.8  If 
Depp wanted to keep his American citizenship, he would have to be willing, as Depp put it, to 
“work for free.”9  
 The United States is one of a small group of nations and an even smaller group of 
industrialized nations that employs a worldwide system of taxation.10  Under a worldwide tax 
system, income is taxed both in the country where it is earned and in the country where the 
taxpayer resides.11  Most other countries employ a territorial tax system.12  Under a territorial tax 
system, income is taxed only at the source.13  In other words, income earned in one country is 
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not taxed anywhere else.14  The United States should jettison the duplicative taxation inherent in 
the worldwide system and adopt a territorial tax system. 
 Foreign tax credits that help offset the portion of a taxpayer’s foreign income that is taxed 
by foreign governments may make Johnny Depp’s remark about working for free somewhat of 
an exaggeration.  However, the credit’s limits make it likely that Depp would have been 
subjected to at least some double taxation.15  This outcome illustrates the need for the United 
States to adopt a territorial tax system. 
 Section II of this note discusses the current state of international tax law both in the 
United States and abroad and the deleterious effects of the worldwide system.  Section III 
outlines proposed legislation to shift the United States from a worldwide system of taxation to a 
territorial system.  Section IV discusses why anti-inversion rules, the inclusion of controlled 
foreign corporation rules in the proposed legislation, and the rise of service-based economies will 
prevent capital flight from accompanying a shift to a territorial system of taxation.  It also details 
how the United States would uniquely benefit from such a shift. 
II.  THE PAST AND PRESENT OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
A.  Contrasting Theories 
 The economics of international taxation has long been dominated by two theories.16  One 
theory, capital export neutrality (CEN), postulates that tax rates on marginal investment should 
be identical regardless of whether an investor is investing at home or abroad.17  According to 
CEN, international tax considerations should be removed from investment decisions by applying 
both domestic and foreign income tax rates to foreign earnings and subsequently leveling the 
difference between the rates through the use of tax credits.18  In other words, if an American 
corporation were to make an investment in a foreign country with a 40% corporate tax rate, the 
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investment would be subject to both the United States’ 35% corporate tax rate and the 40% 
foreign rate.19  The investment would then be eligible for a 35% foreign tax credit in the U.S., 
the maximum amount that may be credited under U.S. law.20  CEN is the operative theory of 
worldwide tax systems.21 
 The alternate theory, capital import neutrality (CIN), represents the principle that tax 
rates on marginal investment in a given country should be identical regardless of where the 
investor is domiciled.22  For example, an American corporation investing in a hypothetical 
foreign country would pay income tax on that investment to the foreign country and nothing to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).23  CIN provides the theoretical basis for territorial 
taxation.24 
B.  A Brief History of International Taxation 
1.  International Taxation in American Law 
 United States policy has always subscribed to the premise of worldwide taxation.25  After 
the income tax was enacted in 1913, Congress made foreign taxes deductible to mitigate the 
double taxation on foreign income.26  Low taxes were a casualty of World War I as governments 
at home and abroad increased taxes to pay for the expensive global conflict.27  In response, 
Congress established the foreign tax credit to further ameliorate the problem of double 
taxation.28  The foreign tax credit may be utilized in one of two ways.29  The taxpayer may 
simply deduct foreign taxes from their U.S. income taxes or the taxpayer may credit foreign 
taxes against their U.S. tax liability on a dollar for dollar basis.30  A panoply of additional 
deductions, credits, deferrals, and exclusions have been added to the U.S. tax code in the ensuing 
nine decades. 
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 Currently, the United States persists in adhering to a worldwide system despite recent 
repeated recommendations from various blue-ribbon panels such as the President’s Advisory 
Panel on Tax Reform and the recent Simpson-Bowles Commission to adopt a territorial 
system.31 
 
2.  The Evolution of International Taxation Abroad 
a. Origins 
 The debate over international taxation has its roots in the League of Nations (the League), 
an international body established in the wake of World War I of which the United States was 
never a part.32  Article 24 of the Covenant of the League of Nations tasked the League with 
disseminating information and assistance relating to matters international in scope.33  League 
economists quickly began taking steps to address the question of international taxation.34 
 In April 1923, the League issued its first report on the matter of international taxation.35  
The League proposed avoiding the problem of double taxation by bestowing the right of taxation 
on the country with which the taxpayer owed an economic allegiance.36  The report posited four 
factors for the determination of such an allegiance:  “(1) origin of wealth, (2) situs of wealth, (3) 
place of enforcement rights to wealth, and (4) where wealth was consumed.”37 
 The 1923 report also identified four possible systems of international taxation.38  The 
first option called for vesting all taxing rights with the jurisdiction in which the income was 
earned, or simply, the “source country.”39  This approach is a territorial system.  The second 
option vested taxing rights with the country “of residence.”40  This approach is a worldwide 
system.  The third option proposed income to be proportionally allocated between the source 
country and country of residence.41  Lastly, the fourth option called for income to classified into 
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different categories with the right to tax some categories of income belonging to the source 
country and the right to tax other categories of income belonging to the country of residence.42  
This was known as the “classification-and-assignment” option.43 
 The League economists favored the second option (the worldwide system).44  However, 
the economists recognized that this approach would not go over well with the countries that were 
not industrial powers.45  They understood that multinational corporations (MNCs) headquartered 
in an industrialized country but with operations in a developing country would pay taxes solely 
to the industrialized country.  This deprived the developing country of any tax revenue from the 
MNCs’ operations within their borders.  Naturally, developing countries would not be fond of 
this proposal. 
 Worried about the practical difficulties in persuading developing countries to adopt a 
worldwide system of international taxation, the League economists put forward the 
classification-and-assignment system for countries at unequal levels of development.46  Income 
was divided into categories based on the principle that corporate parents provided the capital and 
intellectual property to conduct business in foreign locales.47  Therefore, the right to tax income 
that derived from tangible assets such as land, commercial establishments, minerals, and 
agriculture was given to the source country.48  Income that derived from less tangible sources 
was given to the country of residence.49 
 While the classification-and-assignment approach was more palatable to developing 
countries, it presented problems of its own.50  Foremost among these was the problem of 
“homeless income.”51  Homeless income is income that avoids taxation in both the source 
country and the country of residence.52  This is accomplished through the creation of holding 
companies and establishing them as residents in countries with no income tax.53  Thus, when 
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operating under a worldwide or classification-and-assignment system, an MNC could potentially 
escape all or most of its tax liability.54  The recommendations in the 1923 League of Nations 
report did not address the problem of homeless income.55 
b.  Cui bono? 
 The recommendations of the 1923 report revealed a strong bias against territorial 
taxation.56  The economists who wrote the 1923 report believed that territorial systems were 
based on “antiquated theories of taxation and predicted that source-based taxation would 
diminish in importance as semi-developed nations became more industrialized.”57  These views 
reveal a strong desire on the part of the League economists to orient policy towards the needs of 
imperial powers at the expense of colonies and other developing countries.58 
 Foremost among the imperial powers at the time was Great Britain.59  Like most if not all 
imperial powers, Great Britain exported far more capital than it imported.60  Naturally, Great 
Britain recognized that worldwide taxation was in its national interest.61  As the world’s primary 
superpower at that time, Great Britain’s policy preferences greatly influenced the debate.62 
 Despite support for the League economists from powerful interests, the findings 
contained in the 1923 report were not without critics.63  Georg Schanz, a German legal scholar, 
held that depriving a developed country the right to tax the activities of MNCs within its borders 
“was outrageous and contradicted principles held by all countries.”64  Schanz also dismissed the 
classification-and-assignment system as “arbitrary and incapable of being justified on any 
reasoned basis.”65  Schanz proposed the adoption of the proportional allocation approach where 
the great bulk of the income from operations in a source country would be taxed by the source 
country.66  However, Schanz’s argument was not nearly enough to dissuade the League from 
expressing a preference for worldwide taxation.67 
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c.  Permanent Establishments 
 Several years later, the League tasked a group of technical experts, including experts 
from the United States, with the creation of a model convention relating to international 
taxation.68  At the suggestion of the American experts, the group reached a compromise that 
allowed source countries to impose withholding taxes on certain income.69  To prevent double 
taxation, the residence country would provide a foreign tax credit to offset any taxes paid to the 
source country.70  In addition, source country taxation would only apply if the MNC had a 
permanent establishment in the source country.71  These recommendations were included in the 
1927 Draft Model Convention.72 
d.  Insurrection and Suppression 
 Utilizing the template of the 1927 Draft Model Convention, the Polish and Hungarian 
governments executed a bilateral tax treaty in 1928.73  However, the Poland-Hungary treaty 
differed from the 1927 Draft Model Convention by expanding the definition of a permanent 
establishment to include “all permanent representatives of a business entity whether or not the 
representative had the authority to bind the foreign company.”74  This skewed the treaty towards 
territoriality.75   
 Concerned that Poland and Hungary had used the 1927 Draft Model Convention to 
establish a system that had territorial characteristics, the Fiscal Committee of the League of 
Nations took action to prevent further perversions of the model convention.76  The Fiscal 
Committee sought to accomplish this through narrowing the definition of a permanent 
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establishment.77  By 1930, the Fiscal Committee would adopt a permanent establishment 
definition that excluded both foreign subsidiaries and representatives that had no authority to 
bind the corporate parent.78  A subsequent report by the Fiscal Committee confirmed this 
definition of permanent establishment in 1933.79 
 In 1935, the League promulgated a revised Draft Model Treaty that further entrenched 
the principles of worldwide taxation.80  The 1935 Draft Model Treaty was a confluence of three 
principles.81  First, it reaffirmed the definition of permanent establishment as excluding 
subsidiaries and independent agents.82  Second, when allocating profits between source countries 
and countries of residence, the source country may reach only profits from the operations within 
its country and not profits from the entire corporate structure.83  Third, withholding taxes on 
source-based royalties were eliminated.84  Together, these principles removed nearly all vestiges 
of territoriality from mainstream international taxation theory.85  The exploitative practices 
employed by MNCs in developing countries had received ratification by the League of 
Nations.86 
e.  Territorial Gains  
 With worldwide taxation at the height of its popularity, the problem of homeless income 
continued unabated.87  Realizing that the laudable goal of preventing double taxation was being 
usurped by MNCs to create homeless income, the Assembly of the League of Nations charged 
the Fiscal Committee to address what the Assembly referred to as “fiscal fraud.”88  In response, 
the Fiscal Committee admitted that eliminating homeless income had never previously been a 
high priority in their international tax analyses.89  Nonetheless, the Fiscal Committee offered no 
solutions to the problem of homeless income other than suggesting that individual countries take 
independent action to combat “fiscal fraud.”90  Although it was clear that without action the 
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problem of homeless income would continue unabated, the independent action recommended by 
the Fiscal Committee was met with nothing more than a lukewarm response form the members 
of the League of Nations.91 
 Change often only occurs out of necessity and this was no exception.  The problem of 
homeless provoked a tectonic shift in the prevailing attitude towards territorial taxation.  As 
World War II raged, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations permitted a subcommittee to 
explore possible changes to the 1935 Revised Draft Model Treaty.92  This subcommittee 
contained representatives from the developing countries of Latin America.93  Tired of suffering 
under the bias against developing countries inherent in a worldwide system of taxation, the 
subcommittee firmly endorsed the concept of source-based taxation.94  This endorsement 
directly contradicted the multi-decade policy of the League favoring worldwide taxation.95 
 The subcommittee’s findings became known as the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty after the 
country in which the bulk of the subcommittee’s meetings took place.96  The subcommittee 
argued that territorial taxation was the sole method of effectively dealing with the problem of 
homeless income.97  Territoriality would be achieved through the adoption of two provisions:  
“(1) [p]rimary taxing authority over interest, dividends, royalties, and annuities was given to the 
source country, not the country of residence” and “(2) [a] nonresident entity’s business profits 
that are not attributable to a PE [permanent establishment] were subject to source country 
taxation if the activities in the source country were more than isolated or occasional.”98 
 Unsurprisingly, the revolutionary proposals contained in the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty 
were not embraced by the Fiscal Committee.99  But the subcommittee’s work did prompt the 
Fiscal Committee to develop their own revised convention known as the 1946 London Model 
Convention.100  Like the 1946 Mexico Model Treaty, the 1946 London Model Convention was 
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based on two principles.101  First, the taxation of interest, dividends, annuities, and royalties 
derived from commercial, scientific, and industrial property would remain the prerogative of the 
country of residence.102  Second, an MNC’s profits were only subject to source-based taxation if 
it had a permanent establishment.103  The 1946 London Model Convention defined a permanent 
establishment only as a fixed place or business or an agent that was authorized to make binding 
decisions on behalf of the parent corporation.104   
 Once again the Fiscal Commission failed to address the problem of homeless income 
other than reaffirming its belief that homeless income was a problem of tax administration and 
not a side effect of worldwide taxation.105  The Fiscal Committee maintained that the problem 
would be solved only if individual countries took independent action to address the problem.106 
 Despite the Fiscal Commission’s ultimate rejection of the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty, 
the subcommittee’s work left an indelible impression on the international taxation debate.107  
The Fiscal Committee was forced to acknowledge that there was a demand for territorial taxation 
among developing countries.108  Even after reaffirming worldwide taxation in the 1946 London 
Model Convention, the Fiscal Committee understood that territoriality would persist as the 
preference for countries akin to those on the subcommittee.109 
f.  Modern Developments 
 In 1951, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), an international business 
organization, examined the festering issue of homeless income.110  The ICC report advocated 
treating countries in which MNCs located holding companies as countries of residence even if 
those countries did not have income taxes.111  Instead of trying to eliminate the problem of 
homeless income, the ICC report sought to perpetuate it.112  This reflected the ICC’s recognition 
that the international business community had come to rely on homeless income.113 
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 By 1967, the United Nations (UN), the successor organization to the now-defunct League 
of Nations, sought to explore new ways of handling cross-border taxation.114  The UN’s 
Economic and Social Council requested that the UN secretary-general appoint a working group 
of exports from both developed and developing countries to tackle the issue.115  Thus, the Ad 
Hoc Group of Experts on International Tax Cooperation in Tax Matters was born.116 
 The Ad Hoc Group would issue a number of reports between 1969 and 1980.117  At first, 
the Ad Hoc group was reluctant to make any major changes to the prevailing preference for 
worldwide taxation other than expanding the definition of permanent establish to allow 
developing nations to enjoy more tax revenue from MNCs.118  This changed somewhat in the 
early 1970s when the Ad Hoc Group endorsed the idea of allowing source countries to apply a 
gross withholding tax on interest.119  This further chipped away at worldwide taxation. 
 Despite decades of pro-worldwide advocacy from the League of Nations and the UN, 
recent decades have seen a marked increase in the number of countries with a territorial tax 
system.120  Among the highly industrialized economies that form the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the number with territorial systems has doubled since 
the beginning of this century.121  In fact, the United States is among only six OECD countries 
that maintains a worldwide system.122  Moreover, of all the OECD members that have switched 
international tax systems since World War II, none currently use a worldwide system.123   
C.  Competitive Disadvantage 
 U.S. policymakers are well aware that the foreign income of American citizens and 
corporations is subject to double taxation.  To mitigate this problem, Congress has created a 
byzantine and labyrinthine system of deductions, credits, deferrals, and exclusions.  The most 
important of these are the aforementioned foreign tax credit and the rules regarding deferral.   
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 The foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations are generally structured as branches or 
subsidiaries.124  Branches have no separate foreign incorporation and their income is 
immediately subject to U.S. taxes.125  Subsidiaries are foreign affiliates that are separately 
incorporated in a foreign country.126  Most subsidiaries are Controlled Foreign Corporations 
(CFCs), subsidiaries that are more than 50% owned by American shareholders.127  U.S. taxes on 
CFCs are what is known as “deferred,” meaning CFC profits remain untaxed until they are 
repatriated back to the U.S.128   
 The ability of American corporations to use the deferral process to their advantage is 
circumscribed by layers of anti-deferral rules known “subpart F” rules because they are 
enumerated in subpart F of subchapter N of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).129  For example, 
the passive income (dividends and interest) of CFCs and CFC income from transaction with third 
party countries is immediately subject to U.S. taxes.130  These and other provisions greatly 
increase the tax compliance costs for citizens and corporations in worldwide tax systems.  In 
fact, 46% of federal tax compliance costs for Fortune 500 companies emanated from such laws 
and regulations regarding foreign income.131 
 Despite contrary arguments from proponents of the worldwide system, worldwide 
taxation does not insulate American corporations from overseas competition.  Under the current 
system, if American, Irish, and Dutch firms were all bidding for an investment opportunity in 
Ireland, the Irish and Dutch firms would only be subject to the 12.5% Irish corporate income tax.  
The American firm would owe the same 12.5% to the Irish government and an additional 22.5% 
to the American government to account for the difference between the 35% American rate and 
the 12.5% Irish rate which would be ineligible for the foreign tax credit.132  Perhaps other factors 
would allow the American firm to underbid the others regardless of the added tax liability, but it 
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certainly puts the other firms at a comparative advantage vis-à-vis tax considerations.  With over 
90% of non-American OECD-based Forbes 500 companies located in territorial tax jurisdictions, 
American corporations are engaging their competitors with one hand tied behind their backs.133 
III.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A.  The Camp Proposal 
 In the last decade, the “adoption of a territorial tax system has been recommended by the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), the co-chairs of the National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (“Bowles-Simpson” Commission, 2010), the 
President’s Export Council (2010), . . . [and] the President’s Council on Science and Technology 
(2011).”134   In response to such recommendations, Congressman Dave Camp (R-MI), Chairman 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, released a proposal for the adoption of a territorial 
system in October 2011.135  A companion, though not quite identical, proposal was released by 
Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) of the Senate Finance Committee in February 2012.136   
 Chairman Camp’s proposal would exempt 95% of foreign corporate profits from U.S. 
taxation.137  Additionally, a transition tax of 5.25% would be immediately applied to the $1.4 
trillion of existing deferred foreign income.138  Branches would be treated as CFCs, as would 
subsidiaries with Americans owning at least 10% of shares under certain circumstances.139  
Other provisions are designed to prevent base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by limiting or 
eliminating the exemption from U.S. taxes for interest and certain highly-mobile intangible 
assets.140 
 Chairman Camp’s proposal bars credits and deductions for foreign taxes for any dividend 
that is already eligible for the dividends received deduction.141  The dividends received 
deduction merely allows corporate shareholders to deduct dividends on shares the corporation 
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owns in another corporation.142  Included in this are withholding taxes levied by foreign 
governments on dividend distributions previously taxed under subpart F.143  This is a component 
of Chairman Camp’s overall reform of the foreign tax credit apparatus.144 
 Gains realized by American shareholders from sales of stock in a qualified foreign 
corporation would also be eligible for the 95% exemption if certain requirements are met.145  
However, if American shareholders realize losses from such a sale, those losses cannot be 
deducted from U.S. taxes.146  A qualified foreign corporation is defined as a foreign corporation 
with dividend distributions that are eligible for the dividends received deduction.147   
Additionally, a qualified foreign corporation must also meet an active asset standard requiring 70 
percent of corporate assets to be active over the previous three years.148 
 Chairman Camp’s proposal makes only minor changes to subpart F, indicating his 
proposed base-erosion rules would not replace subpart F but co-exist with subpart F.149  One 
base erosion option creates a new category of subpart F income for sales that entail moving 
intangible income from the U.S. to a foreign country.150  Income derived “from the use, 
consumption, or disposition of property in the CFC’s country of incorporation or income from 
services performed in that country” would not be included.151 
 Alternatively, the Camp proposal contains a standard CFC rule.152  This applies U.S. 
taxation to “income earned by a CFC that is not derived from the conduct of an active trade or 
business in the home country of the CFC and is not subject to a 10 percent effective rate of 
foreign tax.”153  Such CFC rules are common among nations with territorial tax systems.154 
 A third base-erosion option presented by the Camp proposal involves the creation of a 
foreign income called “foreign base company intangible income.”155  Foreign base company 
intangible income is simply a CFC’s intangible income.156  Intangible income is defined in the 
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Chairman Camp proposal as anything that has substantial value “independent of the services of 
any individual” such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents.157 
 Under the Camp proposal, foreign base company intangible income is excluded from 
subpart F only if it is subject to a foreign effective tax rate less than or equal to 13.5 percent.158  
This limits the ability of American MNCs to elude U.S. taxes.  Additionally, interest deductions 
would be limited to curb the practice of using debt to generate tax-exempt income.159 
B.  The Enzi Proposal 
 Senator Enzi’s proposal modifies Chairman Camp’s proposal in ways friendlier to 
American MNCs.160  Included among these are a 95 percent dividends received deduction for 
“qualified foreign-source dividends from a CFC.”161  Qualified foreign income is defined as 
income that is “not effectively connected with a U.S. business or received from an 80-percent-
owned U.S. corporation.”162  These dividends would be subject to an effective tax rate of no 
more than 1.75 percent.163 
 Additionally, the Enzi proposal differs from the Camp proposal in that it does not exempt 
income from the foreign branches of an American corporation.164  Instead, each American 
corporation is provided a deduction amounting to 50 percent of its yearly qualified foreign 
income.165  Qualified foreign income is “all intangible income derived . . . through U.S. business 
activity in connection with property sold, leased, licensed, or transferred in any way for use, 
consumption, or disposition outside the United States, or through U.S. business activity in 
connection with services provided for persons or property located outside the United States.”166  
This provision subsidizes the foreign use of domestically-developed intangibles by American 
MNCs .167 
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 Senator Enzi’s draft calls for the replacement of subpart F anti-deferral rules with a “low-
taxed-income test.”168  If any non-qualified business income is not subject to an effective foreign 
tax rate above half the U.S. corporate tax rate it would be subject to taxation under subpart F.169  
Qualified business income is defined as income from business operations in a foreign country 
where the business has a fixed permanent residence that is substantially related to business 
operations in that country.170  Both the low-taxed-income test and determinations regarding 
qualified business income would be conducted on a country-by-country basis.171 
 Senator Enzi proposes a separate limitation of foreign tax credits for foreign taxes on 
intangible foreign earnings.172  Additionally, export sales would be treated as U.S.-source 
income for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation.173 Subpart F would also be tweaked 
by making permanent the exceptions for active finance and active insurance.174 
 Contrary to Chairman Camp’s proposal, Senator Enzi’s proposal would allow, but not 
require, a one-time election regarding the accumulated deferred foreign earnings of a CFC.175  
This income would be subject to an effective tax rate of no more than 10.5 percent.176  While 
each CFC is allowed to make a separate election, the taxable portion may not be reduced by 
foreign tax credits, which is also a provision that is not included in Chairman Camp’s 
proposal.177  The Enzi proposal would allow taxes on increased subpart F income to be paid in 
no more than eight annual installments.178 
 In order to avoid untaxed pre-effective-date earnings ineligible for the Enzi proposal’s 95 
percent dividends received deduction, a corporation must make the election for accumulated 
foreign income during the first year the corporations receives CFC treatment.179  As a result, a 
rule for post-effective-date distributions is a necessity.180  These dividend distributions will be 
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eligible for foreign tax credits only if American corporations pay the dividends to American 
shareholders.181 
 
 
B.  2005 Repatriation Tax Holiday 
 Until the United States adopts a territorial tax system, the benefits such a system would 
yield remain in the realm of conjecture no matter how informed the prognostications.  However, 
the results of a recent experiment are encouraging.   
 In 2004, Congressman Phil English (R-PA) successfully persuaded Congress to insert a 
provision into the American Jobs Creation Act that allowed American corporations to repatriate 
their foreign income subject to a super low 5.25% income tax rate for one year (2005).182  This 
yielded in excess of $275 billion in foreign repatriations.183  The Treasury’s cut amounted to $17 
billion in additional corporate taxes for fiscal years (FY) 2005-06.184  This represented an 
increase of $16.4 billion in two years over what the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
estimated for the same period and a $20.2 billion increase over JCT’s predicted $3.2 billion loss 
in corporate tax revenue over 10 years.185  These numbers also fail to account for the increase in 
other federal taxes that accompanied $275 billion in new investment.186 
 The effect that the tax holiday had on encouraging repatriation was even greater than the 
effect on the exchequer.  For the first time since the records began in 1952, foreign earnings 
retained abroad were negative during the latter half of FY2005.187  The amount of foreign 
income held overseas declined by a combined $142.9 billion during the third and fourth quarters 
of FY2005.188   
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 It is important to note that these were the results of a one-time tax holiday that reduced 
the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 5.25%.  It goes to reason that the increase in 
repatriations would increase substantially if all or nearly all foreign earnings were permanently 
exempt from U.S. taxes as is characteristic of a territorial tax system. 
 
IV.  DISCOURAGING CAPITAL FLIGHT 
 Proponents of maintaining the current worldwide system insist that shifting to a territorial 
system will exacerbate BEPS.189  While discouraging such behavior will always remain a 
concern for policymakers, there are reasons to believe that adopting a territorial system will not 
result in any large scale hemorrhaging of capital. 
A. Anti-Inversion Rules 
 An inversion occurs when a corporate parent moves from one country to another.190  
Most inversions entail a two-step process of corporate reorganization.191  First, the shareholders 
of the parent corporation exchange their stock for stock in newly incorporated foreign 
subsidiary.192  This step removes corporate parenthood from the American corporation and 
places it in the foreign subsidiary.193  However, the corporate entity as a whole remains subject 
to subpart F anti-deferral rules if the American corporation remains a part of the corporate 
structure.194  Therefore, the second step of an inversion is liquidating the American 
corporation.195  Corporate inversions are often used as a strategy to lessen the corporation’s tax 
burden.196 
 Corporate inversions are taxed by the federal government.197  This is justified on 
equitable grounds.198  American multinational corporations have benefitted from their U.S. 
residence through the enjoyment of property rights, limited liability, and other amenities.199  
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Therefore, IRC § 367(a) makes gains from stock transfers to related foreign corporations 
immediately taxable unless stringent regulations are met.200  This serves to make corporate 
inversions costly. 
 To avoid the high cost of inversion, corporate planners have sought ways to 
circumnavigate the rules.201  Federal regulators were alarmed when the publicly-traded 
American personal care products manufacturer Helen of Troy, Ltd. inverted to Bermuda in 
1994.202  Helen of Troy’s clever use of a Bermuda-based holding company to skirt U.S. tax 
liability for both the corporation and its shareholders particularly troubled policymakers.203  In 
response, the U.S. Treasury Department adopted regulations between 1994-96 bringing Helen-
of-Troy-style reorganizations under the U.S. tax net.204  These regulations expanded the 
definition of a taxable stock transfer and curtailed the acquisition of American corporations by 
small or asset-less “shell” corporations abroad.205  This has further limited the ability of 
corporations to expatriate without experiencing significant financial pain.206 
B. CFC Rules 
 Capital flight is furthered discouraged by the proliferation of CFC rules in countries with 
territorial systems.207  Generally, CFC rules exclude from the general foreign income exemption 
income that is both highly mobile and not subject to taxation in the foreign country.208  In other 
words, only income that has real presence in a foreign country, a discernible purpose (other than 
tax avoidance) for being there, and a substantial tax burden enjoys the benefits of territoriality.209  
This greatly limits the abuses of the territorial system without eliminating the benefits of such a 
system.210 
 Such barriers to tax avoidance are included in the Camp-Enzi proposal.211  Specifically, 
Camp-Enzi calls for the exclusion of CFC income that is not tethered to a foreign location and 
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subject to an effective tax rate under 10% from the general territorial exemption.212  This 
provision is analogous to CFC provisions in dozens of other countries.213  
C.  Service-Based Economy 
 As economies advance and populations become wealthier, the demand for various 
services increases.214  Naturally, the service sector comes to account for a greater and greater 
share of total output.215  Today, services account for 70% of total output in OECD countries.216  
This development places intrinsic limits on BEPS. 
 If the U.S. were to adopt a territorial tax system, income earned in the U.S. would still be 
subject to U.S. taxation.  The markets for services are relatively immobile as most services 
require service providers to have some contact with whom they serve.217  Therefore, most 
service industry MNCs require some permanent establishment in the markets that they serve.218  
As the United States remains the world’s largest consumer market, it goes to reason that a shift to 
a territorial system will not deter service industry MNCs from seeking American customers. 
 It is also important to consider the remarkable reversal that has occurred since the end of 
World War II regarding the developed and the developing worlds.  For decades, developed 
countries advocated for worldwide taxation because they were net capital exporters.219  This 
allowed developed to reap the tax benefit from the foreign operations of MNCs headquartered in 
their country.220  Naturally, developing countries objected to this as it deprived them of tax 
revenue from operations within their borders.221 
 During the last half of the twentieth century, the United States shifted from a net capital 
exporter to a net capital importer.222  The irony is completed by the companion shift of many 
developing countries to net capital exporters over the same period.223  The result of this reversal 
of fortune is that MNCs headquartered in developing countries are now coming to the United 
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States and other developed countries in search of investment opportunities.224  Therefore, the 
same worldwide system that used to disadvantage developing countries now disadvantages the 
United States.225  Most other developed countries, including Great Britain, the great imperial 
power of the past, have adapted to this phenomenon by shifting to a territorial system of 
taxation.226 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Macroeconomic events over the last half century have made the worldwide system of 
international taxation increasingly untenable.227  The theory of capital export neutrality has seen 
its time come and go.228  Consequently, the number of nations that employ worldwide systems of 
taxation has fallen precipitously since its mid-century apogee.229  After decades of rejection, the 
age of territoriality has arrived. 
 In light of these developments, the United States should adopt a territorial system of 
international taxation.  The United States of America is an exceptional nation and Americans 
have traditionally prided themselves on their outlier status.  However, there is no need to inflict 
unnecessary hardship on American individuals and businesses for sole purpose of maintaining 
national pride.  Uniqueness for its own sake is not a virtue.  And conformity out of self-interest is 
not a vice. 
 The fact that American citizens and corporations are subject to double taxation under the 
current worldwide system is not disputed.230  In fact, the array of deductions, credits, deferrals, 
and exclusions exists to remedy this very problem.  Like most solutions that mitigate the 
symptoms of a problem rather than attack the cause, this remedy causes problems of its own.  
Instead of diverting resources that would have gone to Uncle Sam through the double taxation of 
foreign earning into productive activities, it merely forces an inordinate amount of resources into 
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the unproductivity activity of tax compliance.  Johnny Depp may not have described this 
phenomena using terms of art but he undoubtedly understood it.231 
 Nor does adhering to a worldwide system improve American economic 
competitiveness.232  In recent decades, the number of America’s competitors located in territorial 
tax systems has increased dramatically.233  However, corporate tax revenue has remained 
remarkably stable throughout the OECD in the face of such a pronounced and one-sided shift.234  
This betrays the presence of incentives discouraging capital flight.  Similar or greater incentives 
either exist or could one day exist in the United States.  In economics, there are no benefits 
without costs, but a shift to a territorial tax system would maximize the former and minimize the 
latter. 
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